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Abstract: The growth of information acquisition, storage and retrieval capacity has 
led to the development of the practice of lifelogging, the undiscriminating collection 
of information concerning one’s life and behaviour. There are potential problems in 
this practice, but equally it could be empowering for the individual, and provide a 
new locus for the construction of an online identity. In this paper we look at the 
technological possibilities and constraints for lifelogging tools, and set out some of 
the most important privacy, identity and empowerment-related issues. We argue that 
some of the privacy concerns are overblown, and that much research and Lifelogging   2 
commentary on lifelogging has made the unrealistic assumption that the information 
gathered is for private use, whereas, in a more socially-networked online world, 
much of it will have public functions and will be voluntarily released into the public 
domain. 
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Introduction 
Technology has always been important as a memory aid but 21
st century computing 
power has provided the means for augmenting memory to a degree hardly dreamt of 
even ten years ago. Information can be stored in enormous quantities, so people no 
longer have to be selective. Technology has nearly reached the stage when all 
information, interesting or otherwise, generated in a lifetime by a single person can be 
assembled and queried relatively efficiently, creating a need for Personal Information 
Management (PIM – W. Jones 2008). This is a step-change in the relation between the 
technology of information storage and human memory, and under the title ‘Memories 
for Life’ (M4L) has been adopted by the United Kingdom Computing Research 
Committee (UKCRC) as a ‘grand challenge’ for computing research (O’Hara et al 
2006).
1
The logical end-point of the drive to store digital information is to store 
indiscriminately, a practice called lifelogging. Lifelogging can be passive – one stores 
the by-products of the life one would have lived anyway – or active – one surrounds 
oneself with sensors and information capture tools to create as rich a picture of one’s 
life as possible.  
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The range of information that can be gathered is almost limitless, but in practice the 
information that is likely to be gathered will be relevant to the lifelogger’s main 
interests, and/or very cheap to gather. Information sources likely to be popular include 
email both sent and received, electronic calendar entries, music downloads and 
listening habits, Web browser information, including bookmarks, navigation history 
and downloads, file system information including document access, EXIF data from 
photographs and biometric sensors, which may be used during medical treatment. It is 
likely that community generated information will become increasingly important. 
This could include photos taken by colleagues, friends and associates, events they 
have been to, music they listen to, and Web 2.0 style tags placed on content. 
One more important type of data is geodata. Some lifeloggers carry around a GPS unit 
to log positional data, and trackers are being incorporated into more devices (e.g. 
smartphones such as the Apple iPhone and the Nokia N95). This wouldn’t always be 
of value – for example, it is hard for such a unit to track movement within a building 
or between buildings in close proximity. Network gazetteers, which provide 
information about locations of wifi hotspots being used by laptops, could fill in some 
of the gaps. An example application which is making use of a gazetteer of wifis and 
their physical locations to expose geo-information is Loki’s Skyhook
2, currently used 
in the Apple iPhone, which implements the W3C Geolocation API
3 to fill in the 
aforementioned gaps. Compass directions of photographs are also of interest here, as 
GPS data tell you where the camera is, not what has been photographed, but a 
direction plus an indication of focus could identify the surroundings of a photograph 
more accurately (Naaman et al 2004). Finally, gazetteers of places are very helpful for 
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searching, because a mapping from GPS coordinates to actual place names is more 
meaningful; nothing about a pair of GPS locations tells you that both are in London, 
for instance. 
The purpose of storage of such information can vary, and may not be clear even to the 
lifelogger at the point of storage, but it is relatively straightforward to gather and 
likely to be of interest either in itself (to the individual who generated it), or to help 
with associative searching. It will help answer the key questions of context mentioned 
above:  what,  where,  when and who; e.g. the question of who was relevant to a 
particular event might be answered with the help of emails, community tags, online 
accounts of events and shared location-based information. 
In an information-intensive age where the surrender of digital identity is a 
commonplace, for purposes ranging from commerce, marketing, social networking, 
government, receipt of services, travel or security, lifelogging has the potential to 
reaffirm the individual’s control of his or her own identity. The lifelog can facilitate a 
constructed identity that outweighs the others simply by weight of evidence, 
complexity and comprehensiveness. It is likely to include other identities, and 
amalgamate and supplement them. 
This paper will examine lifelogging, and discuss the concerns about privately held 
‘Memories for Life’. The next section will profile some of the more prominent efforts 
in this space, as well as setting out some principles and technologies. Then we shall 
consider some of the social aspects of lifelogging. Next, we shall examine some of the 
issues surrounding privacy, identity and accountability for the lifelogger. Finally, we Lifelogging   5 
will end with a brief discussion of the perceived problems with lifelogging 
technology, and a short conclusion. 
Lifelogging 
Lifelogging is not new. One important effort was LifeLog, sponsored by the 
American Defense and Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), conceived as 
an experiment in life-long information capture. Its governing principle was “to trace 
the ‘threads’ of an individual's life in terms of events, states, and relationships” by 
aggregating raw data into a timeline that is an “episodic memory” (IPTO 2003). The 
involvement of a defence research agency was seen as worrying and critics focused on 
the aim of building a database of all the transactions, including credit card details and 
phone calls, of an individual. LifeLog was cancelled in 2004 under pressure from civil 
libertarians (Shachtman 2004), although military planners and technologists remain 
alive to the possibility of harnessing information gathered in routine manner, as for 
example with the slogan ‘every soldier a sensor’ (Magnuson 2007). 
The most famous and comprehensive experiment is the attempt by Gordon Bell of 
Microsoft to create a digital archive, MyLifeBits.
4 This began in 2001, but its roots 
were in Bell’s attempt from 1998 onwards to digitise all documents in all media, a 
high-cost strategy that required a team of full-time personal assistants. MyLifeBits 
was then set up to enable Bell to make sense of the enormous repository of 
information with querying, search, retrieval and new capture tools (Bell & Gemmell 
2007). Steve Mann uses wearable computing to record his daily existence, and has 
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enjoyed media status as ‘the world’s first cyborg’ (Mann & Niedzviecki 2001).
5 His 
latest efforts, using the EyeTap visual memory prosthetic, in effect turning his eye 
into a camera and his body into a Web server, he calls ‘cyborglogging’ or ‘glogging’.
6 
Jennifer Ringley also achieved celebrity and indeed notoriety when she set up 
JenniCam, a webcam that recorded events in her living space, which made available 
on the Internet images of events in her daily life ranging from the mundane to the 
pornographic (cf. Jimroglou 1999). Initially she filtered out private moments, but for 
most of the experiment, which ran from 1996-2003 the images were unfiltered.
7 Other 
initiatives include Total Recall
8 (Cheng et al 2004) and SemanticLIFE
9 (Ahmed et al 
2004). 
Semantic Web technologies 
Most lifelogging projects, such as MyLifeBits, tend to engineer overarching 
knowledge representation formats to integrate information, but it is arguable that a 
simpler route is to retain the heterogeneity of information sources so that applications 
using the information can use the most appropriate mappings between sources, 
depending on which the application is currently exploiting (Tuffield et al 2006b). 
The requirement to query heterogeneous information implies that important 
underlying technologies for lifelogging will be those associated with the Semantic 
Web (Shadbolt et al 2006). One recent effort to develop low-effort lifelogging tools, 
the Semantic Logger, was aimed explicitly at using as many World Wide Web 
Consortium Semantic Web recommendations as possible (Tuffield et al 2006b). The 
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Semantic Logger is able to exploit Semantic Web formalisms as a lingua franca for 
representing information from large-scale, distributed and heterogeneous sources, 
which is the ultimate purpose of the Semantic Web. Such formalisms include the 
knowledge representation language RDF, querying language SPARQL, the 
framework of Universal Resource Identifiers (URIs) and basic structuring of 
information using the Friend of a Friend (FOAF) ontology (Tuffield et al 2006b). 
Adopting Semantic Web technology will allow for lifelogs to be contextualised and 
grounded with respect to web accessible linked data,
10 by making use of resources 
such as dbpedia,
11 a machine-readable version of Wikipedia,
12 to give shared 
identifiers to places one has visited, or MusicBrainz,
13 an open content music 
database, for identifiers for the music they have listened to. Such grounding of terms 
promotes sharing and linking of information resources across communities. 
Services 
The rationale for collecting large quantities of generally unfiltered information is that 
it cannot be specified in advance what information will be useful or not, or what tasks 
the information might be used for. Hence the ideal architecture for a lifelogging 
system should be open not only from the perspective of information sources, but also 
from that of service provision. The Semantic Logger uses a knowledge representation 
store (using RDF) as a persistent repository for the system, and to mediate interactions 
between information sources and service outputs (Tuffield et al 2006b). On such a 
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model, software services could be devised to exploit the information, as well as 
simply querying over the integrated data set. 
One such service is recommendation, where past behaviour is used to suggest items of 
interest. One’s music downloads could suggest other music one might enjoy; 
academic papers saved to disc could suggest other items in the literature; the ratings 
one has given films could be used to suggest future films to watch or DVDs to buy 
(Tuffield et al 2006b). Relevant information might come from a wider social group as 
well as from the lifelogger. Many social sites already exploit information for 
recommendations, such as Amazon and last.fm, but they do not take other information 
into consideration. Recommendations can be finer-grained than is allowed for by such 
sites, because preferences change with location, circumstances, etc. For instance, if 
someone listened to jazz at home, but not in the car, where they preferred louder rock 
music, a more sensitive system could spot the pattern and recommend downloads 
accordingly. 
Another service would be to provide metadata about information in order to facilitate 
search and retrieval (either by oneself or others), a strategy particularly suited to 
multimedia. One example, Photocopain, helps with the traditionally labour-heavy task 
of annotation of digital photographs (Tuffield et al 2006a). 
A third possibility would be creating and populating some kind of avatar, 
knowledgeable about oneself, which could act as an interface between oneself and 
other online actors, making decisions (for instance related to privacy and the revealing 
of information) on one’s behalf. Such an avatar would be an interesting facet of one’s 
identity that could, for instance, be used to construct narratives about one’s life, to Lifelogging   9 
populate social networking sites, or partially to automate one’s interactions with 
governments or companies (Wilks 2006). 
The provision of medical history is a fourth example. Possibilities include: (a) sensor 
data to monitor changes in current health of the individual, or so-called telemedicine; 
(b)  community-wide effort to prevent or monitor an epidemic; (c)  the use of 
technology accurately to determine someone’s diet, a notoriously difficult thing to 
measure; (d) monitoring the use of household gadgets (e.g. kettles or fridges) to signal 
that the user (perhaps a frail person) remains in good health (O’Hara & Shadbolt 
2008, 15-16). There are services which allow people to upload medical records, such 
as Google Health
14 or Microsoft’s HealthVault,
15 while social networking methods 
have been used to support Web 2.0-style information sharing about symptoms and 
treatments of various illnesses, such as PatientsLikeMe,
16 which hosts a number of 
MySpace-like communities discussing conditions such as Motor Neuron Disease or 
Parkinson’s. 
Non-solipsistic lifelogging 
The MyLifeBits model is centralised and labour-heavy, and needs tweaking if 
lifelogging is to take off as a pastime or as a way of life. In general, it has been often 
assumed that lifelogging is a solipsistic activity, hoarding information about oneself 
for one’s own purposes. This, we argue, is likely to be a mistaken assumption, even if 
it is true of many (but not all) of the early pioneers of the practice. 
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The original rationale for lifelogging was as a personal tool to manage one’s own 
information. However, since the early experiments the practice of social networking 
has developed, where users generate and share information with others. This 
information can be quite specific in type, such as del.icio.us which allows people to 
share their Web bookmarks. The site can be based around a specific medium, such as 
YouTube which allows sharing of video, or Flickr which allows sharing of 
photographs. Or the networking site can be quite general, such as Facebook and 
MySpace which allow people to connect and interact, revealing as much information 
about themselves as they care to post. Meanwhile, other practices such as blogging 
admit conversation, information and discussion into the public space. 
In this context, information gathered by lifelogging practices could be shared or 
enhanced by integration or cross-reference with information from others. As the re-
creation of context enriches information, there is no reason in principle why the 
information sources upon which context-recreation draws should be restricted to ones 
controlled by oneself. Someone else’s calendar might be as informative as one’s own 
when it comes to retracing events in one’s life. 
This suggests there is mileage in integrating the information describing people and 
their social relationships which is exposed by social networking sites. Portability of 
data across applications is already an important concern as people wish to carry data 
and personal profiles or identities across sites. Much of the information is non-
sensitive and its creators are keen to share it – for instance, film ratings and music 
downloads. Lifelogging   11 
It is probable, given the current profile of those who spend a significant proportion of 
their lives online, that the activities of lifelogging and social networking will intersect. 
Some social networkers will use lifelogging techniques to generate large quantities of 
information for their own use and to share with friends or like-minded people, while 
also incorporating social information to add further contextual information to their 
own lifelog. 
There are complex balances to be struck in this area, but there is a clear distinction 
between information about one that is out there, and personal information. Personal 
items, such as Web browsing habits, geodata or emails, can be stored in a personal 
knowledge base, while public domain information, including personal information 
that the user has deliberately exposed on social networking sites, can be stored 
separately. Although lifelogging involves gathering data in a relatively non-
discriminating manner, that does not rule out discrimination in the treatment of the 
data. In particular, the distinction between publicly available data and data one does 
not wish to expose becomes more pressing as ‘techy’ lifestyles such as lifelogging and 
social networking are pursued simultaneously. 
In such an environment, privacy protection is clearly an imperative. The Semantic 
Logger uses a three-way system to produce a basic implementation of an intuitive 
trust model. It consists of a central KB where public data are held and published, 
while two password-protected KBs are created for each user. The first holds the user’s 
private data, while access to the second can be granted to friends. Hence – as with life 
offline – one’s online identity as determined by the lifelog can be decomposed into 
entirely personal aspects, aspects reserved for one’s intimates, and a public face 
(Tuffield 2006b). More complex systems, for example exploiting FOAF, could Lifelogging   12 
implement restrictions, for instance, to people who are friends or friends of friends but 
no further down the chain. 
Social lifelogging developing extends the solipsistic model by adding in shared 
information, and sharing information one generates oneself. This augmented lifelog 
will be harder to control. It will be possible to delete information over which one has 
control (one’s own photographs or blog), although if others are linking to it that may 
become bad manners. If one’s lifelog links to someone else’s information, then that 
cannot necessarily be deleted, although one could remove links to it. The picture of 
oneself that emerges will be more socially-based, and less inwardly-directed. 
Furthermore the information will contain a number of important organising principles, 
rather than simply being an unstructured dataset. The use of Semantic technologies 
will support the exploitation of metadata mediated by ontologies. The metadata may 
take the form of personal metadata or social metadata, depending on whether it is 
captured and stored directly by the lifelogger, or harvested from the Web. 
As an example of the use of social metadata, consider the exploitation of geolocation 
metadata by the Semantic Logger (Tuffield 2006b). Location information is taken 
from the photo-sharing site Flickr, in the form of geo–tagged images, and from the 
social networking site Facebook. Through the use of linking events, based on iCal and 
Facebook events, it is possible to suggest that two Facebook friends may have been at 
the same location. This piece of social information would allow for images taken at 
the same time to share tags, and hence increase the available contextual information 
surrounding that piece of multimedia. Lifelogging   13 
Privacy, identity and accountability  
Privacy concerns 
It is of course hard to predict precisely what the trajectory of such online social 
developments will be. The assumption of a series of concentric ‘privacies’ in this 
space may also be too strong, though the simplicity of the Semantic Logger’s model is 
attractive and not demanding. Privacy tends not to be concentric, but generally takes 
the form of something like a Venn diagram of interlocking and overlapping spaces, 
where the Semantic Logger’s transitivity assumption (if X can have access to p, and Y 
is a closer friend than X, then Y can have access to p) does not hold. Indeed, there is 
empirical evidence from the blogging world that quite often diarists actively prefer 
strangers to read their material, but discourage intimates (Sorapure 2003). 
The rise of social networking may well have downgraded the instrumentality of trust. 
The general problem of trust is to connect, preferably causally, trust and 
trustworthiness. A causal connection can go in two directions: one is from 
trustworthiness to trust, which we might call Weberian, and the other is from trust to 
trustworthiness, which we might call Durkheimian. The Weberian method is the 
default for the Web and Semantic Web (in which trust plays a prominent part – 
Shadbolt et al 2006), where the would-be trustee begins by being trustworthy, and to 
be trusted must prove trustworthiness via some mechanism, which might be 
reputation, credentials or whatever (Golbeck 2006). The idea is to minimise risk, but 
risking opportunity cost of a failure to trust. 
However, the Durkheimian model, where one trusts another, thereby welcoming him 
or her into one’s moral community, which then generates (as people are social beings) Lifelogging   14 
trustworthy behaviour, is becoming more popular particularly in the world of social 
networking. People put out social information on the possibly implicit assumption that 
although risks of harm are present, the dangers of harm are small. A few people will 
engage deeply with one’s personal information, and will therefore be sympathetic. 
Most people will be uninterested or positively hostile, but, life being short and their 
being strangers, they will merely ignore one’s website, rather than actively seek to 
trash it, vandalise it, leave offensive comments or misuse information revealed (de 
Laat 2008). A common variation on this is the thought that malign behaviour is 
actually more likely to be shown by friends (possibly offended by comments or 
intimate thoughts) and offline acquaintances, rather than strangers (Sorapure 2003). 
The social networking world seems to be governed by Durkheimian rules different 
from more instrumental views of the Web which tend to follow the Weberian model 
(although whether this is driven by Web designers rather than Web users is perhaps a 
moot point). As Durkheimian trust is risky, we cannot rule out the possibility that 
social networking is going through a particular ‘moment’ when it appears to be 
sustainable, and that attitudes and perceptions will change and a more suspicious 
culture arise. 
It is clear, particularly on the reasonable conceptualisation of privacy as a condition of 
restricted access to information about a person (Allen 1988), that the Durkheimian 
trust that is exhibited in social networking generally, and social lifelogging in 
particular, will threaten privacy. Anita Allen has reviewed a number of privacy issues 
that are raised by lifelogging (Allen 2008), and though the issues she raises are 
certainly real, her examples of lifelogging are based on the existing literature, rather 
than the likely trajectory of lifelogging practice. In the socio-technical context we Lifelogging   15 
have stressed, where lifelogging is not necessarily a solipsistic activity, and 
information coverage is partial and opportunistic rather than dedicated and 
maximised, the worries appear overblown to some extent. 
First, she points out, there may be many occasions when the preservation of 
‘memories’ is a bad idea. Misfortunes or misjudgements would be preserved, creating 
in effect a false picture of a time period. It is true that unwanted as well as wanted 
information is likely to be preserved, but the situation with lifelogging may be less 
pernicious than other methods of preserving the past. A traditional collection of 
photographs will also give a skewed version of past events, but with the added 
problem of a lack of context. 
Allen gives the example of someone slapping a friend at a party: the incident is 
captured by a dozen bystanders and the story leaks out. If that person deletes the 
incident from her lifelog, she will still be prevented from forgetting the incident, even 
if she has been forgiven. This is a regrettable situation to be sure, but not one unique 
to lifelogging. In these days of digital photography, such circumstances are becoming 
common; surveillance has been democratised. Surely the lifelog has the advantage 
that, by being a richer account of the incident, it can at least be put into some sort of 
perspective. The slap can be placed in the context of the friendliness of the rest of the 
party, possibly the proximate cause (drink?), the forgiveness, the regret and the long 
years of friendship before and after the incident. 
Allen is correct to say that “people … have a legitimate moral interest in distancing 
themselves from commonplace misfortunes and errors,” but it seems incorrect to add, 
as she does, that “in order to create that distance, they need to be safe from memory.” Lifelogging   16 
Actually, the distancing process must involve coming to see that the incident was 
atypical, uncharacteristic and not to be repeated. It is a mistake from which a lesson 
should be learned, and for that, the incident needs to be seen as a whole – which 
cannot happen with the single snapshot, but might with a lifelog which draws 
information from public as well as private sources. Merely forgetting, on the other 
hand, seems to rule out having learned the lesson. 
Secondly, Allen highlights complex issues to do with mental health and trauma, and 
worries that lifelogging might encourage pathological rumination about the past. It 
may be hard to persuade a patient that “lifelogger capta are not fixed, ‘hard’ evidence 
of an important whole story, rather than … something partial, ambiguous, 
unimportant and interpretable”. Again, one cannot deny the nugget of truth in this 
thought; equally, as Allen herself points out, pathological rumination by those 
obsessed with the past can happen in the absence of any reliable memory at all, never 
mind partial and ambiguous ones. 
Furthermore, our reply to Allen’s first worry also applies here. The sheer wealth of 
detail in a lifelog might actually support therapy. If the therapist wished to stress the 
ambiguity of the past and the partiality of the patient’s memory of it, what better way 
than to provide a richer account? It is harder to maintain that one embarrassing photo 
tells the whole story of a gathering when another hundred unembarrassing ones are 
easily available. Different patients doubtless need different therapies, but it seems to 
us at least plausible that a richer story will be valuable on some occasions to 
contextualise a patient’s pathological rumination. Lifelogging   17 
Allen’s third worry is pernicious surveillance, and we do not wish to deny that this is 
an important issue. There are three routes by which lifelogging might become 
surveillance. First, lifelog data may feature the actions of others in photographs, 
telephone calls, email exchanges and so on. Second, the tools for gathering data about 
oneself might also become tools for gathering data about others. Third, governments 
have a lot of power to insist that information that exists is made available to them; as 
Allen points out, current laws give the US government “access to virtually all means 
of communications and data storage” and there is no reason to believe that it would 
stop at lifelogs, or that it could be designed out of the technology (Allen 2008). 
A related issue is that lifelogging might be a private good that damages the public 
good by creating costs that do not accrue to the individual lifelogger. Bailey and Kerr 
(2007) have argued that the law relating to privacy has a connection with the 
‘reasonable expectations of privacy’ within the relevant society. It may well be that 
the practice of lifelogging could decrease those reasonable expectations of privacy, 
and therefore undermine privacy protection. 
There clearly is a danger that lifelogging, if it ceased to be a minority pursuit, could 
develop unpleasant overtones. Allen is correct that governments are likely to want to 
appropriate whatever information exists – they are not noted for restraint in this area – 
but there may be an argument to say that lifelogging technology in itself is neutral. 
Yes, people may incriminate themselves, but equally they may do so with any record 
they make of their activities. Yes, others may be incriminated, but equally they may 
be so by any kind of record. The lifelog, being a richer account, may be more 
incriminating, possibly, than other types of record (e.g. CCTV pictures), but equally 
might be less incriminating, providing essential context and removing circumstantial Lifelogging   18 
ambiguities. Indeed, as well as providing a case for the prosecution, a lifelog might 
also provide a case for the defence. We will return to this point in more detail below. 
Yes, spying might be a problem, but by a parallel argument, if lifelogging became a 
widespread practice, then spies or obsessives might be easier to spot, because they 
would feature on others’ lifelogs. 
If expectations of privacy have fallen, then people are more likely to be on their guard 
– awareness is a sort of protection against surveillance. However, this does bring us to 
Bailey and Kerr’s important point (2007) about the decline of reasonable expectations 
causing a related decline in legal privacy protection. They note that Jennifer Ringley 
originally wanted to present a realistic picture of the life of a young woman, to show 
that it was not like an episode of Friends. JenniCam certainly was neither as 
entertaining nor as false as that show, but Ringley could not keep control of her 
information, and soon pornographic images filtered out of the total set began 
appearing out of context. The total picture soon became the edited picture. 
There is a question, which has recurred throughout this section, as to whether 
lifelogging makes the current situation, where surveillance is constantly increasing, 
any worse. At the moment, one might reasonably expect to appear on some record of 
events if one appears in public, and one would be wise to conduct oneself 
accordingly. Lifelogging may increase the probability that one actually did appear on 
a record, assuming the practice becomes widespread, but it is not clear that lifeloggers 
would impinge on a different class of situations. 
One already should expect that one’s emails, Web browsing history, Web 2.0 content 
and iCal entries will be visible for a long time. Appearing in public makes one liable Lifelogging   19 
to appear in digital photographs already, as well as CCTV footage. Other types of 
lifelogger information, such as geodata, document access records and biometric 
sensors are unlikely to convey much extra about other people. There may be some 
lifelogging technologies, such as Microsoft’s Sensecam pioneered by Bell, that could 
increase the probability that one’s privacy was infringed, but currently these are not, 
and may never be, widely used. Hence, although it is certainly a problem that 
reasonable expectations of privacy are in decline, and Bailey and Kerr are right to 
draw attention to this, at the moment there seems no reason to think that lifelogging 
will make a serious contribution to it, compared say, to the intrusive surveillance 
activities of governments. 
The dialectic between public and private is highly complex. It is arguable that Jennifer 
Ringley was not properly aware of the nature of the threat to her privacy posed by the 
JenniCam (Bailey & Kerr 2007), but a different model of lifelogging would focus on 
information both public and private, with two-way traffic between the individual and 
his or her social network(s). Although Ringley published information routinely and 
indiscriminately, that is not an essential part of lifelogging. Social networks and 
formalisms such as FOAF allow one to relinquish some control over one’s 
information, while remaining within one’s comfort zone – much as happens in offline 
life where several external identities can be maintained to interact with friends, 
family, lovers, enemies, workplace colleagues and so on. Ultimately it may be that 
lifelogging does not reduce reasonable expectations of privacy, but rather that 
reasonable expectations of privacy will dictate lifelogging practice. 
If the days of practical obscurity are numbered by the development of digital 
technologies, then arguably it is preferable (a)  to provide rich rather than sparse Lifelogging   20 
accounts of an incident, and (b) to provide access to diverse sources of information, in 
order to allow corroboration or otherwise of particular pieces of data. In each case, 
lifelogging, all things being equal, is more likely to fit the bill. 
Identity 
The privacy argument is clearly real, but it must be offset against the empowerment of 
the individual that lifelogging can provide. Perhaps the most important way in which 
this can happen is to give the lifelogger sufficient control over his or her information 
to act as a counterpoint to initiatives by formal authorities – and informal ones, such 
as families, too – to impose artificial identities. There are many sources of unwanted 
identities, whether or not it is the creation of a formal system of ID cards, a financial 
identity or an informal family insistence that one conform to social norms with respect 
to dress or sexual behaviour. The lifelog, for the lifelogger, might constitute the “real” 
person. 
Against this, it may be argued that it is hardly an identity. In the first place, the 
indiscriminateness of information collection undercuts claims that anything 
interesting has been constructed, while secondly it has yet to be established that the 
lifelog is anything more than a data set. This is certainly a valid point if a digital 
identity is defined as a structured set of parameter values specified in advance, either 
held on some database held to be canonical (as with an official ID) or that can be 
associated with a high degree of accuracy with some personal and unchanging 
characteristic (a biometric). In other words, a system of identification is set up in 
advance, and the subject surrenders some information in order to be identified by the 
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Such an approach can be valuable in conceptualising and defusing the privacy issue. 
We do not want to develop a full-scale informational identity theory here, but we 
would like to sketch a position that renders the claim that the lifelog is an identity 
plausible. To begin with, consider an argument made by Floridi that privacy issues 
emerge because of an apparent contradiction between a desire to maximise 
information flow, because of the benefits this brings, and a desire for a high level of 
information protection to preserve privacy (Floridi 2005, 197-198). His answer is to 
draw a distinction between the sharable information about oneself which can flow 
freely, and the ontic data that “constitute someone,” a much smaller set that can and 
should be restricted without undermining the benefits of a high information flow. 
Floridi’s ontological theory specifically considers each person as constituted by his or 
her information (Floridi 2005, 194), and argues that this is a way forward from 
unsatisfactory privacy theories that either seek to boost the individual’s control over 
his/her information, or to restrict access to that information for everyone else. 
However, the problem with this is that, if we accept the claim that “we are our 
information,” the result is unsatisfactory when combined with Floridi’s privacy 
argument. A person is a complex moral and physical being, who may have important 
properties that vary according to the people with whom he/she comes into contact, 
and will certainly have varying moral attitudes and obligations. The complexity of 
personhood is unlikely to be capturable either by a one-size-fits-all database or 
biometric – indeed, a quote from Proust used by Floridi (2005, 194-195) undercuts the 
notion of a constitutive biometric rather neatly. This is not to say that simple ID 
systems are not entirely adequate for restricted functions in particular contexts, only 
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that functionally goes beyond the legitimation of e-voting or the use of a credit card 
online then a wider notion is surely required. 
Such notions are available in the Lockean tradition that locates personal identity in 
consciousness, specifically memory. In this tradition, the lifelog has an important role 
to play in supporting the lifelogger’s own identity, as it collects information that the 
lifelogger him- or herself has targeted to support memory. The lifelog need not be the 
identity, but provides a wide range of materials for the lifelogger to deploy and edit. 
Nonetheless, the lifelogger cannot be in total control; analogous to the way in which a 
Lockean identity can force someone to face up to responsibilities and less savoury 
aspects of the past, the lifelog is likely to contain reference to unfortunate aspects of 
the past that could be edited out but need not be. It may be too time-consuming to, e.g. 
remove all evidence of a drunken exploit, a prison sentence or a less-than-fondly-
remembered boyfriend or girlfriend, and the use of publicly-held information as well 
will make it even more difficult. 
The lifelogger has sufficient control to develop other personae that not only counter 
official or unwanted identities, but are powerful enough to achieve things in the online 
world. We do not suggest that this sketch constitutes a well-worked-out theory of 
personal identity, and indeed the idea that a lifelog constitutes, or contributes 
significantly to, identity is not crucial to the main claim of this paper, that many of the 
privacy concerns surrounding lifelogs are overblown. 
It should also be pointed out that the identity need not be as diffuse as the picture 
suggested above, and could be focused around some highly specific data or identifier 
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The Semantic Logger system creates a focus for the digital identity by the adoption of 
a Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) to refer to the user, consistent with the use of 
Semantic Web technology. Setting up a log requires the user to create a URI which 
will be associated with all the personal information logged. A FOAF document, 
developed using the FOAF ontology to model users and social networks, is imported 
into the personal knowledge base (KB) of the user, in which the primary subject of the 
document is the user’s URI. The FOAF document can then point to other pieces of 
information about the user or his or her friends, so creating a linked structure of 
information available on the Web. This is in line with recent thinking about the 
creation of decentralised Web-compatible identity protocols, which can be harnessed 
to various security and trust-enhancing protocols (Weitzner 2007). In particular, the 
existence of the URI need not impinge on privacy; if we refer back to the example of 
the use of social geolocation metadata in the previous section, Flickr reflectors expose 
user-based information in HTTP-resolvable RDF, using the SOIC ontology, but 
people surfing a public Flickr page or a publicly available RDF representation of a 
Flickr page will not have enough metadata to connect the information with the 
owner’s public FOAF URI, unless they already know it. 
The Semantic Logger produces an amalgamation of data about the user from 
distributed online sources in a single KB, providing a global view of personal 
information published on the Web. Information about the user can be gathered and 
associated, though not necessarily stored in one place as separation is useful to help 
identify the provenance of a particular statement. Although of course the published 
information is in the public domain, users can see the information collected, and can 
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monitoring of the Web to protect one’s good name against what is becoming known 
as ‘cyberspite’ (e.g. posting negative comments on auction sites about people who 
have posted negative comments about you) has become an area of commercial interest 
(D. Jones 2008). 
Accountability of the individual 
There are other positive effects of lifelogging, and in the rest of this section we will 
briefly review two of them. First, as well as material to create identities to counter 
imposed identities, the lifelogger has material to create countervailing representations 
of the past. For example, an art professor at Rutgers, Hasan Elahi, who was arrested in 
2002 on serious terrorism allegations despite being absolutely innocent of any 
criminal or terrorist activity, has taken to lifelogging and posting the information on 
the Web as a pre-emptive alibi (Coughlin 2007).
17
Accountability is an increasingly prominent aspect of life, and indeed Allen has 
argued strongly that it should be not only a fact, but a value (Allen 2003). She notes 
that the spread of social, economic and political freedoms combined with ambivalence 
about privacy has led to a culture in which it is often expected to make public 
apparently intimate details about one’s life, now that one is more or less safe from 
state punishment. Freedom and openness of conduct results in more people knowing, 
and wanting to know, about it. One may deplore this increase in accountability, but as 
a trend it is hard to ignore. Even if one does ignore social pressure, there is still 
accountability in law, to courts, to the media, to one’s intimates, to government, and if 
                                                 
17 http://trackingtransience.net/. Lifelogging   25 
Allen is correct, to those groups of people who share aspects of one’s identity (e.g. 
one’s race, one’s gender – Allen 2003). 
By accountability, Allen means the expectation or requirement to inform others of, 
explain or justify conduct; depending on the context, one may also be subject to 
punishment. In a situation where the lifelogger is accountable for something, he or she 
is empowered by the lifelog to the extent that it allows him or her to provide 
information to satisfy the expectation, or provide evidence that competing accounts 
are false. The information provided would have to be authenticated of course, but 
even so at least one has access to the basis of an account. 
So, to take the example of Elahi’s arrest, had he been lifelogging earlier, he would 
have been able to construct an account of his activities to counter the FBI’s. In a 
fraught legal situation such as being questioned on terror charges, it is not enough to 
counter the authorities’ theories. One needs a certain level of proof, and the stronger 
the evidence against one, the better one’s proof needs to be. Indeed, a lifelog may well 
be exceedingly rich in detail – we have emphasised the potential for the amalgamation 
of information from many different sources – and so aspects of the lifelog may well 
corroborate others. The Flickr photos may support GPS data, which may support an 
iCal entry which may support the veracity of the content of blogs or emails. 
Furthermore, social lifelogging as we have described gives an element of objectivity 
to the account. In general, the richer the evidence base of an account, the more 
convincing it will tend to be. 
The empowerment is not of course total. A lifelog will be of most use when the facts 
are in dispute, but sometimes it is the explanation of behaviour that is at issue. Lifelog Lifelogging   26 
information tends not to reflect interior or cognitive states (although contemporary 
blog writings may lend weight to the account). Lifelog evidence may be legitimately 
challenged (just because one’s GPS unit was at point x at time t, that does not mean 
the lifelogger was the person carrying it). One may of course be guilty all along, and 
the lifelog may provide evidence against one, a possibility against which Allen warns 
(2008). The existence of a lifelog, if known, would render it liable to seizure and 
examination by the authorities. 
Accountability of others 
The technology is also helpful for the practice of what has been called ‘sousveillance’, 
community-based recording of events to democratise the process of surveillance. 
Rather than traditionally owned and controlled surveillance techniques being used to 
monitor a community, sousveillance supports the monitoring of the authorities, for 
instance searching for and reporting misdeeds by police forces, or electoral fraud, in a 
distributed way by a community (cf. Bailey & Kerr 2007, Brin 1998, Mann & 
Niedzviecki 2001, O’Hara & Shadbolt 2008, 181-183). 
There are obviously pros and cons to sousveillance, and many have drawn attention to 
the privacy concerns therein, but an indiscriminate account of one’s own life is ipso 
facto an indiscriminate account of one’s dealings with authority, and can therefore be 
used to hold them to account. Typically one would expect to have to bring 
information from the lifelog into juxtaposition with other information to provide 
significant accountability, and the possibility of this will increase if the lifelog is 
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The empowerment envisaged here depends on one’s identification with a community. 
It is the community that will benefit from, e.g. the exposure of a political 
representative as neglectful of constituents’ concerns, and it is the community as a 
whole that will need to provide evidence of that neglect, and indeed to publish and 
read it. Assuming that the lifelogger is interested in his or her community welfare, 
then by the provision and collection of lifelog information he or she is empowered to 
make a contribution. 
Discussion 
The previous section remains speculative, both in respect to whether lifelogging will 
seriously reduce privacy, and whether it will be empowering. There are grounds, we 
suggest, for thinking that the good will outweigh the harm, and indeed that the harm 
will be minimal. Ultimately, this is an empirical matter, as all authors on the topic 
freely admit, and our speculations may well need to be revised once hard data comes 
in and tricky cases hit the courts. At a minimum, however, we argue that there is no 
reason to rush into regulation. 
As lifelogging tools are currently a matter for research rather than commercial 
application, there is a window for reflection about privacy and regulation. There have 
been some unrealistic suggestions, such as programming imperfections into the 
system, deliberate random error that would prevent the lifelog from being veridical, 
and therefore from invading privacy (Dodge & Kitchin 2007). There has also been 
unfounded optimism, as with Cheng and colleagues, who are sanguine about the use 
of lifelog data by the judicial system (Cheng et al 2004). In contrast, Allen warns that 
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should never be required to keep a lifelog, should own their own lifelogs and should 
be allowed to delete content at will (Allen 2008). 
Tools to gather data will have obvious applications for surveillance, and this is a 
powerful worry, as evinced by the fate of the DARPA LifeLog project. One should 
not be forced (either by law or social pressure) to keep tabs on oneself, but 
discussions about privacy and lifelogging have made unwarranted assumptions which 
skew the privacy arguments. Many presume that the data are necessarily personal, 
though they may be public domain, but why think that information gathered should be 
kept private? The publication of the information might just be the point. 
Furthermore, although Mann, Elahi and Ringley relish or relished the unblinking gaze 
of the technology, and Bell is omnivorous in his information consumption, the 
universality of their approaches is (in the cases of Mann and Bell at least) facilitated 
by large-scale resources behind them, and in all four cases licensed by a personal 
ideology of information. Real life, whether online or off, is rarely so ideologically 
driven or well-resourced, and it is unlikely that many lifeloggers would be universalist 
in their assumptions. A more likely scenario is that the information stored would be 
rich in some respects and poor in others. The logger might invest in a new gadget that 
provides information of a certain sort in detail, before the novelty wears off and the 
information dries to a trickle. Loggers might periodically forget to take GPS devices 
with them on their perambulations. New interests or a change of circumstance might 
result in more or less information being stored. The picture is likely to be patchy; 
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In this more nuanced environment, lifelogging tools can provide the user with 
somewhat more control, gathering together his or her appearances in the public 
domain. Knowing what can be seen is an important first step in the preservation of 
privacy, and it is important that restrictions or distortions are not brought into 
lifelogging tools that prevent this empowerment of the user. One’s online identity has 
public and private aspects, and focus on the private aspects will be misleadingly 
partial. Furthermore, the social aspects of the Web are where its interest lies for many 
people. Restrictions on their ability to construct their own identity would be a severe 
curtailment of their personal freedom. 
There may still be worries about the permanence of the record. Transience is one of 
memory’s outstanding aspects and forgetting is part of good mental housekeeping 
(Schacter 2001). Nevertheless, the picture is not as clear as might be thought. 
Lifelogging can be used to measure which pieces of information are recalled directly 
or used indirectly in associative recall, which could help structure search and recall so 
that information that was never or rarely used was less prominent in results (rather as 
PageRank imposes an ordering of importance on webpages). Paradoxically, one could 
use lifelogging techniques to decide which information to delete (although deletion 
goes against the grain of the lifelogging ethos). 
Conclusion 
Commentary on lifelogging has tended either to geeky techno-optimism, or warnings 
of potential dangers. The optimism is probably overdone, as optimism tends to be. 
Certainly the dangers exist, but the discussion so far is framed on possibly false 
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scope, (c) include information that has traditionally been held private by owners, and 
(d) become a mainstream activity, possibly via social pressure. The falsity of any one 
of those assumptions would undermine the arguments against lifelogging, and it is 
quite conceivable that all four of them are false. 
That is not to say that privacy questions will not arise with lifelogs, as they clearly do 
with other digital activities such as social networking. Reasonable expectations of 
privacy are currently in flux – the Web is evolving faster than legal and ethical 
systems can respond – but lifelogs do not pose special or unique issues, despite the 
undiscriminating nature of information gathering. 
We have also argued that lifelogging can be empowering for the logger, allowing him 
or her information which can be used in the construction of a personal online identity, 
or identities, which is not under the control of authorities. Furthermore, as 
accountability is increasingly important in society, lifelogging can help both in 
accounting for the lifelogger’s personal behaviour, and in holding others to account. 
A final point: lifelogging sounds somewhat recondite, but personal knowledge 
management is an issue for anyone with a significant Web presence, or who uses 
digital technologies. Lifelogging is an extreme case, but the tools and interfaces that 
support it will also support querying of and retrieval from smaller repositories of 
personal data collected using more discriminating methods, a fact that is captured by 
the term ‘Personal Information Management’. To that extent, lifelogging tools are 
tools for everyone to exert more control over their personal data, their public presence 
online and their digital identity. Lifelogging   31 
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